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Supreme Court of .Pennsylvania.
ET AL. v. ALLEGHENY VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
principle that the duty which the master owes to his servant, to
a
general
It is
provide him with safe tools and machinery, does not involve the engagement that
they will always continue in the-same condition.
It is not negligence in the master if the tool or machine break from an internal
original fault, not apparent when the tool or machine was first made or provided,
or from an external apparent fault; for it is the duty of the servant to observe and
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report to his master apparent defects.
But a different rule applies if the tool or machinery be perishable; the employer
is bound to know that fact, and it is his duty to renew such instruments at proper
intervals.
The constructive knowledge of the serviat does not relieve the master from acting
upon the
on the constructive knowledge which is -chargeable to him, nor impose
servant the duty of notifying the master of that which he ought to know.
an
Declarations as to the defectiveness of an instrument, made immediately after
accomaccident by a delegate of the master, are not binding upon the master unless
accident.
panied by an admission of knowledge of the defect existing before the

to the Common Pleas of Clearfield county.
Trespass on the case, by Bridget Baker et al., wife and infant
children of Bartley Baker, to recover damages for the death of
the said Bartley Baker, ensuing from the alleged negligence of the
defendant.
Upon the trial, the plaintiffs' evidence showed the following
ERROR

facts: Baker was one of a gang of men working on a gravel train,
and on September 15th 1876, the day of the accident, was engaged,
with others, in hoisting heavy stones upon the cars of the gravel

train.

In loading the stones, the men used a derrick, which con-

sisted of an upright wooden mast, about twelve inches in diameter

at the ground, and about fifty feet in height, and held in place by
of
four guy-ropes attached to the top of the mast, the other end

the ropes being anchored to posts in the ground.

To the mast of

the derrick was attached a crane with pulley-blocks, tackle, &c.
two
On the morning the accident happened, the men had loaded
the
in
cars,
the
of
one
on
standing
or three stones. Baker was
a
and
work,
the
of
charge
in
act of obeying an order of the man
way
gave
guy-ropes
the
of
heavy stone was being raised, when one
on account of the rottenness of the rope, and the mast of the derrick fell with great force, striking Baker across the breast, from

the effects of which he died within an hour after he was hurt.
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At the time Baker was hurt, he was working under the direction
of Daniel Nolan, who then had, under the defendant company, the
exclusive charge and direction of the gravel train and men connected with it, and had authority from the company to hire and
discharge the men who worked in his crew. William McGregor
was superintendent of the work at Summit Tunnel, where Baker
was killed.
The derrick was furnished by the defendant, and had not been
used for some time previous to the day of Baker's death. It was
an old structure, erected in 1873, and the guy-ropes, although
originally sufficiently strong, had been exposed constantly to the
weather, without change, for a long time. There was evidence
that they were old and decayed, and were unsafe and unfit for the
purpose for which the derrick was used at the time it fell. There
was also expert testimony that such ropes, after being exposed to
the weather for a year, were unsafe and unfit to sustain a heavy
weight.
The plaintiffs proposed to prove that Nolan, the superintendent
of the gravel train, a few minutes before the accident happened,
said to this witness, or in his hearing, that one part of the men
should go to one side of the derrick, as it was not safe; this order
not being given to Bartley Baker, or in his hearing, to the witness's knowledge. Objected to, because the offer is immaterial
and irrelevant; because no order there given by Daniel Nolan
could affect the defendants or make them liable in damages to the
plaintiffs, he being a co-employee; and because such order may
have been given, and the witness not have heard it, and the testimony does not show such order was not given to Baker, if it was
material to prove that it was not. Objections sustained (1st assignment of error.)
Plaintiffs' second offer was as follows:Q. What did Mr. McGregor say at the time the rope was
examined, immediately at the time of the accident, as to its cause,
if anything? Objected to, because it is immaterial and irrelevant
under the proof in this stage of the cause; and because the plaintiffs have not shown that McGregor held such a relation to the
defendants as would make his declarations admissible to affect the
defendants. Objection sustained (2d assignment of error.)
The plaintiff having closed, the court, on motion of defendant,
entered a compulsory nonsuit, and the court in banc subsequently
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refused a motion to take it off; whereupon the plaintiffs took this
writ, assigning for error the rejection of their offers, and the
refusal to take off the nonsuit.

Frank Fielding and aeorge A. Jenks, for the plaintiffs in
err
ff. T. Beardsley and Wallace & .Krebs, for the defendant in
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, C. J.-The deceased, to recover damages for whose
death this action was instituted in the court below, was a laborer
employed by the defendants in hoisting stones upon the cars of a
gravel train. For this purpose a derrick was used, or upright
wooden mast held in place by guy-ropes; and, while in the act of
raising a heavy stone, one of the ropes broke, and ihe mast of the
derrick fell with great force on the deceased, inflicting an injury
from the effects of which he died within an hour.
Whether the defendants were pritna fade liable was the question:
in other words, did the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs make
out such a case as ought to be submitted to the jury? The
learned judge below thought not, and accordingly nonsuited the
plaintiff.
The facts in regard to the rope may be briefly stated: It was
about two inches thick, and there was every reason to believe that
it was originally sufficiently strong for the purpose for which it
was used. But there was evidence that the derrick was an old
structure, and the ropes at the time of the accident had been in
use two or three years, perhaps more. During this time they had
been exposed to the weather. Several witnesses who examined
the rope immediately after the accident, testified that at the place
where it had broken it was rotten and unsafe, and there was evidence that such was commonly the result of the exposure of such
a rope to the weather, for that or a much shorter period of time.
There is no dispute as to the law applicable to such a case. It
has been long and well settled. A servant assumes all the ordinary
risks of his employment. He cannot hold the master responsible
for an injury which cannot be traced directly to his negligence.
If it has resulted from the negligence of a fellow-servant in the
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same employment, he must look to him and not to the master for
redress. The master does not warrant him against such negligence. The duty which the master owes to his servants is to provide them with safe tools and machinery, where that is necessary.
When he does this he does not, however, engage that they will
always continue in the same condition. Any defect which may
become apparent in their use, it is the duty of the servant to
observe and report to his employer. The servant has the means
of discovering any such defect which the master does not possess.
It is not negligence in the master if the tool or machine breaks,
whether from an internal original fault, not apparent when the tool
or machine was at first provided, or for an external apparent one
produced by time and use, not brought to the master's knowledge.
These are the ordinary risks of the employment which the servant
takes upon himself: (Ryan v. The Cumberland Valley Railroad
Co., 11 Harris 384).
But do these rules apply to such an instrument as a rope used in
a derrick which is employed in raising heavy weights? No doubt
a perfectly new rope, and one to all appearance sound, may break,
and the master would not be responsible for the consequences,
having furnished a rope of the proper size for the purpose, to all
appearances sound. But there was evidence in this case, sufficient
certainly to make a question for the jury, that such a rope, after
having been used for a year or more, and exposed during that
time, as the one in question seems to have been, was no longer a
safe rope, even though it did not outwardly exhibit any signs of
decay. The master is bound to know that a rope under such circumstances will only last a limited time. It will not do for him
to furnish a sound rope, and then fold his arms until by actually
breaking it is demonstrated to be insecure. It will not do to say
that the servant is bound to know this as well as his master, and
to warn him that after such a time he ought to procure a new rope.
Is the servant bound to notify the master of that which he knows
or ought to know himself without such information? He knows
how long the rope has been in use. The servant may not know.
In this case the deceased did not know. It appears to have been
the first day that he worked on the derrick. There was nothing
to attract his notice in the outward appearance to show bow long
it had been in use. It is the duty of employers to renew instruments of this character at proper intervals. The expense would
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certainly not be great, and a due regard to the lives of their
servants imperatively demands it.

The order given by Nolan just before the accident was rightly
excluded. It did not show that he knew of the defect in question,
but was a caution given to the men to keep out of the way of an
accident which might happen to the best rope. He was a competent witness, and might have been examined on the part of the
plaintiffs. As to the declaration of McGregor, it did not sufficiently appear that his relations to the work were such as to make
his declarations evidence. As the case goes back to another trial,
it can be shown what his office and duties were. Besides, it would
appear that the declarations proposed were made after the accident,
and were not of such a character as to show that he had previous
knowledge of any defect of the rope. After seeing the broken
rope his opinion that it was an unsafe one would not be binding on
the company more than the declaration of the opinion of any
other witness. Unless the declaration was to the effect that he
knew before the accident that the rope was unsafe, it could not fall
within the cases of Hanover Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 5 P. F. Smith
396, and Mullan v. Philadelphiaand Southern Mail Steamship
Co., 28 Id. 25.
Judgment reversed, and procedendo awarded.
"The general rule," says Chief Justice SHAW, in Farwdl v. Boston 4- Worcester Railway Co., 4 Met. 49, "resulting from considerations as well of justice as of policy, is, that he who engages
in the employment of another for the
performance of specific duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and
perils incident to the performance of
such services, and, in legal contemplation, the compensation is adjusted acThis rule is fully suscordingly."
tained by numerous decisions of both
American and English courts. At the
same time this, like all other rules,
has its exceptions. In Ford v. Ftchburgh Railway Co., 110 Mass. 241, the
court said: "The rule of law which
-,empts the master from responsibility
to the servant for injuries received from
the ordinary risks of his employment,

including the negligence of his fellow
servants, does not excuse the exercise
of ordinary care in supplying and maintaining proper instrumentalities for the
performance of the work required. One
who enters the employment of another
has a right to count on this duty, and is
not required to assume the risks of the
master's negligence in this respect. The
fact that it is a duty which must always
be discharged, when the employer is a
corporation, by officers and agents, does
not relieve the corporation from that obligation. The agents who are charged
with the duty of supplying safe machinery are not, in the true sense of the
rule relied on, to be regarded as fellowservants of those who are engaged in
operating it. They are charged with
the master's duty to his servant. * * *
The corporation is equally chargeable,
whether the negligence was in originally
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failing to provide or in afterwards failing to keep its machinery in safe condition."
In Priestleyv. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1,
although the court was not called upon
to decide how far knowledge, upon the
part of the master, of vices or imperfections in the carriage used by the servant
injured would make him liable, it nevertheless said: " He (the master) is no
doubt bound to provide for the safety of
the servant in the course of his employment, to the best of his judgment, information and belief." Applying this doctrine to a corporation-in Bartonshill
Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas.
288-Lord CRAuwonTu said, it was an

established principle "that when a
master employs his servant in a work
of danger, he is bound to'exercise due
care in order to have his tackle and machinery in a safe and proper condition,
so as to protect the servant against unnecessary risks." See also Bartonshill
Coal Co. v. JftGuire, 3 Macq. H. L.
Cas. 307.
In Clarke v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937,
the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to oil dangerous machinery, and
he was injured in consequence of its
remaining unfenced. He had complained
of the dangerous condition of the machinery, and the manager of the defendant had promised that the fencing should
be restored. In the course of the argument, Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W.
I, being cited as an authority, that
whenever a servant accepts a dangerous
occupation, he must bear the risk, CocKBuim, C. J., remarked: "That is,
whatever is fairly within the scope of the
occupation, including the negligence of
fellow-servants ; here it is the negligence of the master." CROMpTox, J.,
added : "It cannot be made part of the
contract, that the master shall not be
liable for his own negligence."
CocKaunr, C. J., in delivering the
opinion of the court in Clarke v. Holmes,
said: "I consider the doctrine laid
VOL. XXIX.- 92

down by the House of Lords, in the
case of Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, as
the law of Scotland with reference to
the duty of a master, as applicable to
the law of England also, namely, that
when a servant is employed on ma-'
chinery from the use of which danger
may arise, it is the duty of the master
to take due care, and to use all reasonable means, to guard against and lrLvent any defects from which increased
and unnecessary danger may occur."
Again, the Chief Justice says: "The
rule I am laying down goes only to this,
that the danger contemplated on entering into the contract, shall not be aggravated by any omission on the part of the
master to keep the machinery in the condition in which, from the terms of the
contract, or the nature of the employment, the servant had a right to expect
that it would be kept."
Air. Justice BYLES added: "But I
think the master liable on the broader
ground, to wit, that the owner of dangerous machinery is bound to exercise
due care that it is in a safe and proper
condition. * * * The master is neither,
on the one hand, at liberty to neglect
all care, nor, on the other, is he to insure safety, but he is to use due and
reasonable care. * * * Why may not
the master be guilty of negligence by
his manager or agent, whose employment may be so distinct from that of the
injured servant, that they cannot, with
propriety, be deemed fellow-servants ?
And if a master's personal knowledge
of defects in his machinery be necessary
to his liability, the more a master neglects his business and abandons it to
See
others, the less will he be liable."
also, to the same effect, Murphy v. Phillips, decided in 1876, in the Exchequer
Division of the High Court of Justice,
35 Law Times Rep. 477.
The rule recoguised in the English
courts appears to be, in the words of
Mr. Cooley on Torts 599, that "if the
servant having a right to abandon the
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service because it is dangerous, refrains
from doing so in consequence of assurances that the danger shall be removed,
the duty to remove the danger is manifest and imperative, and the master is
not in the exercise of ordinary care
umless or until he makes his assurances
good. Moreover, the assurances remove
all ground for the argument that the servant, by continuing the employment,
engages to assume the risk :" Iolnips v.
Worthington, 2 Fos. & Fin. 535; Holmes
v. Clarke, 6 Hurlst. & N. 349; Clarke
v. Holmes, 7 Id. 942.
There are certain implications of law
in a contract, such as we have been considering, between master and servant.
The implication on the part of the servant is, that lie risks the dangers which
ordinarily attend or are incident to the
business in which he voluntarily engages
for compensation. The implication on
the part of the master is, that he shall
supply the physical means and agencies
for the due conduct of the business, in
the selection of which means and agencies he shall exhibit due care. His negligence in that respect is not a hazard
incident to the business, nor yet a risk
which the servant is presumed to run,
inasmuch as the servant has, ordinarily,
no connection with the original provision
of the instrumentalities used by him, or
with their preservation and maintenance
in suitable condition, after they have
been supplied by the master. And this,
even, although they may originally have
been suitable and in good condition. In
considering what dangers the servant is
legally presumed to risk, the court, in
Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 557,
said: "But this presumption cannot
arise where the risk is not within the
contract of service, and the servant had
no reason to believe he would have to
If it were otherwise,
encounter it.
principals would be released from all
obligations to make reparations to an
employee in a subordinate position for
an injury caused by the wrongful conduct

of tile persons placed over him, whether
they were fellow-servants in the same
common service or not. Such a doctrine
would be subversive of all just ideas of
the obligations arising out of the contract of service, and withdraw all protection from the subordinate employees
These corof railrcad corporations.
porations, instead of being required to
conduct their business so as not to endanger life, would, so far as this class
of persons were concerned, be relieved
of all pecuniary responsibility in case
they failed to do it. A doctrine that

leads to such results is unsupported by
reason and cannot receive our sanction.'
Of course, the application of these principles does not go the length of guaranteeing the absolute safety, under all
circumstances, of employees, or the
warranting of the absolute perfection of
its apparatus or machinery provided for
the use of its servants. Reasonable and
adequate safety, as far as due care both
in the selection and maintenance in
proper condition of the machinery and
instrumentalities employed, is all that
can be expected. No human provision
or foresight can effectually guarantee
absolute security from misadventure.
The master is, therefore, not liable for
defects which he could not discover or
foresee, nor for the negligence of servants who, although performing different
and more responsible duties than those
performed by the servant injured, are
yet engaged in the same general business with him under a common supervision.
Thus, in Quincy Ifining Co. v. Kitts,
42 Mich. 34, the company was held not
liable for injury to a miner in their employ caused by the breaking of timbers
which could not be traced either to any
apparent defect or to necessary decay
from length of service, and it was
further held that even if the accident
was due to the negligence of a timberman who was employed under the generil
superintendent of the mine to look after

BAKER v. ALLEGHENY VALLEY RAILROAD CO.
the timbers, such timberman was a fellow.servant with the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that he was chargeable
with a different duty and a greater responsibility than the latter.
With respect to the question of contributory negligence, it is entirely a
question for the jury whether the plaintiff used due care on his part. The
mere knowledge of an alleged defect,
which, perhaps, he himself had pointed
out, if followed by a promise on the part
of the master or his agent to repair the
defect, will not, of itself, be sufficient
to fix the servant with contributory negligence : Ford v..Fitchburg Railroad Co.,
supra; Laning v. N. Y. Central Railroad
Co., 49 N. Y. 521. In such a case, the
burden of proof of contributory negligence is upon the defendant: RailroadCo.
v. Gladrmon, 15 Wall. 401. If the servant, after discovering a defect in the
machinery, continues to use the apparatus without giving notice of such defect
to the mastar or the proper officers of
a company, the case bears a very different complexion. In such a case, he
would undoubtedly be guilty of contributory negligence, at least so far as
the defect in question was the cause of
the injury sustained. He would, in such
case, have voluntarily risked the very
danger he apprehended from the very
cause the knowledge of which he did not
disclose, and of which he alone might have
been cognisant. But "where a master
has expressly promised to repair a defect,
the servant can recover for an injury
caused thereby, within such a period of
time after the promise as would be
reasonable to allow for its performance,
and" possibly "for an injury suffered
within any period which would not preclude all reasonable expectation that the
plomise might be kept :" Sherm. & Red.
on Neg., sect. 96 ; Conroy v. The Vulcan
Iron Works, 62 Mo. 38; Patterson v.
P. 4 C. RailroadCo., 76 Penn. St. 389;
LeClair v. Railroad Co., 20 Miun. 9;
Brabbits v. Railay Co., 38 Wis. 289;

Ford v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 110
M{ass. 241.
The American cases are numerous on
this question, and in the absence of any
positive statute in any particular state,
the general principles prevail.
At the same time, it is true that in an
action by a servant against his employers to recover damages for a personal
injury caused by the use of defective
machinery or materials employed in the
business, the observance of due care and
caution on the part of the servant is indispensable to his right to recover: Pennsylvania Co. v. Lynch, 90 Ills. 333. The
question of what amounts to ordinary
care and caution is, however, for the
jury: Eilert v. G. B. 4-Minn.Railroad
Co., 48 Wis. 606. But whether a state of
facts admitted or proved constitutes negligence, is generally a question of law to
be determined by the court: Catawissa
Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Penn.
St. 282; Ptdla., Wilm. 6- Bait. Railroud Co. v. Stinger, 78 Id. 219 ; Gerety
v. Railroad Co., 81 Id. 274. But this
is not unusually a question of law and
fact to be decided by the jury uder
direction: Penn. Co. v. Rathgeb, 32
Ohio St. 66.
In Hinds v. Overacker, 66 Ind.547, it
was held that a servant is liable to a coservant in damages for a physical injury
resulting to the latter by means of the
negligence of the former, in the performance of labor for a common master.
In Rinds v. Harbou, 58 Id. 121, the
court said: "We do not clearly perceive how it can well be, that in the
little community of employees of the
same employer, upon the same general
undertaking, the common duties of man
to man in society generally should cease
to exist, and as a consequence, liability
for breaches of them." See also to the
same effect Osborne v. Morgan, 20 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 399, overruling Albro
v. Jaquith, 4 Gray 99.
As between master and servant, it is
the duty of the former to furnish for use,
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in the prosecution of his business, good
and suitable machinery, and keep it in
repair: Wright v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 562; Laning
v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
49 Id. 521; Flike v. Boston !- Albany RailroadCo., 53 Id. 549 ; Corcoran
v. Holbrook, 59 Id. 519. It is also
the duty of the master, to furnish for the
management of such machinery, careful
and trustworthy servants, and if these
conditions were fulfilled, the plaintiff,
though injured by the negligence of his
fellow-servant, could maintain no action
against their common principal: Coon
v. Syracuse 6- Utica Railroad Co., 5 N.
Y. 492. But neither upon principle nor
authority can it be held, that the negligence of a servant in using imperfect
machinery excuses the principal from
liability to a co-servant for an injury
which could not have happened had the
machinery been suitable for the use to
which it was applied : Cone v. Del., Lack.
lestern Railroad Co., 81 N. Y. 206.
W.
The defendant, having failed in his
duty was liable, although the employee
in charge of the engine could have so
managed it that the defects in it would
have caused no harm.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held
that railroad companies are bound to use
applications which are not defective in
construction; but as between them and
their employee, they are not bound to
use such as are of the very best or most
approved description. If they are such
as are in general use, that is all that can
be required. Also, that an employee
who continues in the service of the company with knowledge of any danger that
he incurs, cannot recover for injtries
sustained, notwithstanding it may appear
that if different machinery had been
used, his situation would have been less
dangerous : Smith v. The St. Louis, Kansas City 4- Northern Railway Co., 69
Mo. 32. The master's duty of selecting
and maintaining safe machinery and
competent servants is discharged by the

exercise of reasonable or ordinary care ;
and this, as in every other situation, is
measured by the character, the risks,
and the exposure of the business : King
v. Boston, 4-c., R. Co., 9 Cush. 112; Mad
River, 6-c., Co. v. Barber,5 Ohio St. 541;
Kansas PacificRailway Co. v. Little, 19
Kans. 269 ; Manville v. Cleveland, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 1 I Ohio St. 417 ; Wonder
v. Baltinore, 6-c., Railroad Co., 32 Md.
411 ; Searer v. Boston, 4-c., Railroad
Co., 14 Gray 466 ; Ford v. Ftchburg
Railroad Co., 110 Mass. 240 ; .Ione.i v.
Granite Mills Co., 7 Rep. 146 ; Lewis
v. St. Louis, 4-c., Railroad Co., 59 'Mo.
495 ; Cooper v. Iowa Central Railroad
Co., 44 Iowa 134, and numerous other
cases.
If, on the other hand, the master has
neglected to use ordinary and reasonable
care not to subject the employee to unreasonable or extraordinary dangers,
such as he could not be supposed impliedly to agree to encounter the risk of,
and the servant has, in consequence,
been injured, without fault on his part,
and without having voluntarily assumed
the risk of the result of the master's
negligence with full means of knowledge at his command, the servant may
recover damages of his employer: Jones
v. Yeager, 2 Dill. 64 ; Dillon v. Union
PacificRailroad Co., 3 Id. 319. Connecticut: Hayden v. Sunithville Man. Co.,
29 Conn. 549. Illinois: Chicago Railroad Co. v. Sweet, 45 111. 197 ; Illinois,
dch, 52 Id. 183;
6-c., Railroad Co. v.
Schooner Norway v. Jensen, Id. 373;
Chicago, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Taylor,
69 Id. 461 ; Perry v. Ricketts, 55 Id.
234 t Illinois, 4-., Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 69 Id. 650; Toledo, 4-c., Rail.
road Co. v. Fredericks, 71 Id. 294; Fairbank v. .Haentezche, 73 Id. 236, &c.
Indeed, the decisions throughout the
states, so far as they have come under
our observation, on this point, appear to
We select a few of the
be in accord
more prominent:Maine: Buzzell v. Laconia Man. Co.,
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48 Me. 113; Lawler v. Androscoggin,
A-c., Railroad Co., 62 Id. 463; Shanny
v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Id. 420.
Maryland: Cumberland, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. The State, 44 Md. 283 ; Cumberland, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. The State,
use of Hogan, 45 Id. 229.
Massachusetts: Cayzer v. Taylor, 10
Gray 274; Snow v. Housatonic Railroad Company, 8 Allen 441 ; Hackett v.
Middlesex Man. Co., 101 Mass. 101 ;
Huddeston v. Lowell Machine Co., 106
Id. 282 ; Walsh v. Peet Valve Co., 110
Id. 23; Summersell v. Fsh, 117 Id. 312;
Arkerson v. Denison, Id. 407.
Michigan: Fort Wayne, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. Gildersleeve, 33 Mich. 134; Botsford v. Mich., 4-c., R. R. Co., Id. 256.
Missouri: Gibson v. Pacfic Railroad
Co., 46 Mo. 163; Devittv. Pacific Railroad Co., 50 Id. 302; Lewis v. St.
Louis, kc., Railroad Co., 59 Id. 495;
Porter v. Hannibal, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
60 Id. 160; Conroy v. Vulcan Iron
Works, 62 Id. 35; Keegan v. Kavanaugh, Id. 230; Dale v. St. Louis, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 63 Id. 455; Nolan v.
Shiclde, 3 Mo. App. 300; Stoddard v.
St. Louis Railroad Co., 65 Mo. 514.
New Jersey: Paulmier v. Erie Railroad Co., 34 N. J. L. 151.
New York: Plank v. New York, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 1 N. Y. S. C. (T. & C.)
319 (affirmed. 60 N. Y. 607) ; Keegan
v. Western Railroad Co., 8 Id. 175;
Syan v. Fowler, 24 Id. 410 ; Laning v.
New York, 4-c., Railroad Co., 49 Id.
521 ; Booth v. Boston, 4-c., Railroad Co.,
67 Id. 593; McMillan v. Saratoga, 4c.,
Railroad Co., 20 Barb. 449; Wright v.
New York, 4-c., Railroad Co., 28 Id.
80; 25 N. Y. 562; Connolly v. Poillon,
41 Barb. 366 ; Spelman v. Fisher Iron
Co., 56 Id. 151.
Ohio: Arad River, 4-c., Railroad Co.
v. Barber, 5 Ohio St. 541 ; Columbus,
4-c., Railroad Co. v. Webb, 12 Id. 475;
MeGatrickv. Wason, 4 Id. 566.
Pennsylvania: O'Donnell v. Allegheny
Valley Railroad Co., 59 Penn. St. 239;

Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Id. 58; Patterson
v. Pittsburgh, 6-c., Railroad Co., 76 Id.
389; Mullan v. Philadelphia, 4-c., Railroad Co., 78 Id. 25; Strangev. McCormick, 1 Phila. 156.
Texas : Houston, 6-c., RailroadCo. v.
Dunham, 49 Tex. 181; International
Railroad Co. v. Doyle, Id. 190; Houston,
-c., Railroad Co. v. Oram, Id. 341.
Vermont: Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59.
Wisconsin: Wedgwood v. Chicago,
4-c., RailroadCo., 41 Wis. 478; 44 Id.
44; Dorsey v. Phillips, 4-c., Co., 42 Wis.
583.
The servant, however, may be deemed
to assume the risk of the danger known
or discoverable, and to waive any claim
for damages against the master in case
it shall result in injury to him, if be voluntary enters into or continues in the
employment without objection or complaint.
The following cases are sufficient to
establish that waiver. Though the master's want of knowledge is not sufficient
to exonerate him, he being under an affirmative duty of inspection and inquiry,
negligent ignorance will operate to charge
him the same as knowledge. It is sufficient that he ought to know that his tackle
is staunch and secure, and should not
induce his servant to enter upon his
duties under a false impression of sscurity. This point has been already discussed. A few cases are sufficient to
show where the servant has, by his own
conduct, waived his claim for damages:
Assop v. Yates, 2 Hurl. & N. 767;
Grffiths v. Gidlow, 3 Id. 648; Skipp v.
Eastern Counties Railroad Co., 9 Exeh.
223; Woodley v. Metropolitan Railroad
Co., 2 Excb. Div. 384 ; Ogden v. Rummens, 3 Fost. & Fin. 751; contra: Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., Law
Rep., 7 Exeb. 130 ; Keilley v. Belcher,
6-c., Mining Co., 3 Sawyer 500; Dillon
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 3 Dill.
319 ; Jones v. Yeager, 2 Id. 64; Hayden v. Smithville Man. Co., 29 Conn.
HUGH WEGHTMAN.
548.
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Supreme Court of Micigan.
MANN v. WHITE RIVER LOG AND BOOMING COMPANY.
The handling of logs, as managed by log-driving and booming companies, is not
properly to be treated as common carriage; and such companies are not subject to
the common-law liabilities of common carriers.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Milskegon county.
F. W. Cook, for plaintiff in error.
Frank Bracelin, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-Plaintiff sued defendant for not delivering part
of a quantity of logs which the company had in charge to deliver
at White Lake, after running them down from their place of
reception on White river. As the case was passed upon by the
jury they necessarily found that there had been no fault or negligence in defendant, and the only question before us is whether
defendant was a common carrier, and liable at all events, except
for the risks of a public enemy or inevitable casualty. The duty
undertaken by the defendant was in accordance with its statutory
power to drive, run, raft and boom logs in White river, for any
person having logs to float down the stream, and the ase shows
that the work of all kinds was done at regular rates, and for all

alike.
The dispute, therefore, is narrowed down to the single question
whether the handling of logs, as managed by the log-driving and
booming companies, is properly to be treated as common carriage.
It is admitted to be like common carriage in the universality of the
duty, and by statute a lien is given for charges, not only on the
specific logs for charges on each, but on a part to secure the whole
charges: Comp. Laws, sect. 2788. The statute, moreover, gives a
special remedy to enforce the lien. Is also contemplates, by the
section just referred to, that it is only in the absence of express contract that a uniform rate is provided for. These rights resemble, in
important respects, the rights of common carriers. But the statute
contains no declaration that the companies shall be so treated, and
the whole matter is left to be determined by legal analogies.
When we look at the business done, it will be found to resemble
in some respects the business of carriage, and in some respects it
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is like different business, while in most things it is peculiar and
subject to its own conditions. It has one peculiarity in which it
differs entirely from common carriage, which was held by this
court in Fiteh v. Newberry, 1 Doug. 1, to create no rights against
property not voluntarily intrusted to the carrier. One important
part of the compensated business of these companies includes the
temporary control of logs interfering with the free running of the
body of logs in the stream: Comp. Laws, sect. 2793. The peculiarity which is most apparent is that there is no carriage whatever
either in vehicles or by application of motive power, unless in some
emergency. The logs of various owners are usually, as they were
in the present case, set floating promiscuously, and only sorted and
separated when the run is as to some portion at ]east substantially
completed. The logs are floated down the streams by the force of
the current, sometimes aided by dams and flooding, and if it were
not for the risk of jams, no interference to any great extent would
be needed. The chief work of the companies when running and
driving logs is to see that they are kept in the way of floating
down stream, and not allowed to accumulate in jams and obstruct
the floatage. And it is to prevent this that the compulsory powers
are exercised.
It is manifest that this kind of service differs very much from
the possession and transfer of articles which are always in custody
and which could not be moved except by the vehicles of the carrier. Among the somewhat fanciful reasons given for the peculiar
duties and responsibilities of common carriers, we cannot always
determine how far any of them actually operated in shaping the
legal rules. But it is dangerous to run after supposed analogies
and extend peculiar rules to new cases substantially different from
the old. Courts have no doubt settled the law of common carriers
as applying to all classes of carriage, however free from most of
the special risks and temptations which were relied on to uphold
the ancient doctrines. But when it is sought to extend the rules
outside of the carrying business altogether, we should not do this
unless on very plain reasons of fitness. Taking heed to give no
excessive force to resemblances, we may find, nevertheless, some
other duties which are quite as analogous as carriage. Droversor as the common law calls them agisters-perform functions not
unlike those of log-drivers. Their animals move themselves, while
logs are moved by the stream, and the beasts have a species of
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intelligence, while logs and currents move unconsciously. Yet the
chief business of the men in charge of both is to prevent the property from straying or stopping, and to guide it where it belongs.
Ne one regards drovers as carriers: Angell on Carriers, sects. 24,
52; Story on Bailments, sect. 443.
The entire absence of any motive power, and the function of
guiding and regulating things which move themselves or are moved
by some independent force, make it impossible to treat these classes
of business as carriage in fact, and it is difficult to see how, if involving no carriage, there is any propriety in calling them carriage.
There is always hardship and often wrong in holding persons
liable for what they have done their best to avoid. While we are
bound to respect established rules, we cannot wisely extend them
beyond their reasonable application. We think the court below decided correctly that the extreme liabilities of common carriers did
not apply to defendants.
The judgment must be affirmed with costs.
"To

bring a person," says Judge

STORY in his work on Bailments, sect.
495, "within the description of a common carrier, he must exercise it as a
public employment, he must undertake
to carry goods for persons generally,
and he must hold himself out as ready
to engage in the transportation of goods
for hire, as a business, not as a casual
A common
occupation pro uzc vice.
carrier has therefore been defined to be
one who undertakes, for hire or reward,
to transport the goods of such as choose
to employ him. from place to place."
"Common carriers," says Chancellor
KENeT, 2 Com. 598, "undertake generally, and not as a casual occupation, and
for all people indifferently, to convey
goods and deliver them at a place appointed, for hire, as a business, and
with or without a special agreement as
to price."
"The definition of a common carrier
most usually adopted in this country,"
says Mr. Hutchinson in his work on
Carriers, sect. 47, note, "is that of
C. J. PARKER in Dwight v. Brewster, 1
He is there defined to be
Pick. 5o.

' one who undertakes for hire, to transport the goods of such as choose to
employ him, from place to place.' In
Gisbourn v. Iurst, I Salk. 249, hP is
said to be 'any man undertaking for
hire to carry the goods of all persons
indifferently.' And this is said by C. J.
Ginso-T in Gordon v. Ilutcinson, I W.
& S. 285, to be ' the best definition of
a common carrier in its application to
the business of this country.'"
Mr. Hutchinson himself, in his work
on Carriers, sect. 47, gives the following
definition: "A common or public carrier is one who undertakes as a business,
for hire or reward, to carry from one
place to another, the goods of all persons who may apply for such carriage,
provided the goods be of the kind which
he professes to carry, and the person so
applying will agree to have them carried
upon tile lawful terms prescribed by the
carrier; and who, if he refuses to carry
such goods for those who are willing to
comply with his terms, becomes liable to
an action by the aggrieved party for
such refusal."
The definition of Mr. Hutchinson,
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winle somewhat less general than the
others quoted above, agrees with them
in making the carriageof goods a necessary element of the definition. Indeed,
as to those classes of business involving
no active carriage, it is difficult, as
stated by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court in the
principal case, to see how, if involving
no carriage, there is any propriety in
calling them carriage. Although it is
wholly immaterial in what kind of vessel or vehicle, or for what distance the
carrying is done (Hutchinson on Carriers, sect. 58), such carriage, in fact,
must exist or be contemplated before
the extraordinary liabilities of a common
carrier can attach. Thus, where there
are no goods to be transported, but only
a message to be delivered, as in the
case of the business of telegraph companies, the liability of the telegraph
company, according to the weight of
authority, is not that of a common carrier: Leonard v. N. Y., 6-c., Telegraph
Co., 41 N.Y. 571 ; Breese v. U. S.
Telegraph Co., 48 Id. 132; Tyler v.
West. Union Td. Co., 60 Ill. 421, 427 ;

Hutchinson on Carriers, sect. 81. So,
warehousemen, wharfingers and forwarders of freight, so long as they confine themselves to the business which
their names import, and which do not
involve the carriage of the goods, cannot
be held liable as common carriers Hutchinson on Carriers, sect. 62. So,
according to the weight of authority,
the owners of a steamboat employed in
the towing of other boats or vessels, do
not incur the responsibility of common
carriers as to the tow, the property
towed not being delivered to them nor
placed within their exclusive custody or
control: see Hutchinson on Carriers,
sect. 79, where the cases are fully collected.
The question decided in the principal
case appears to be one of first impression, and in view of the definitions and
rules above quoted, and the reasoning
of the opinion itself, will, we think, be
accepted and followed as an eminently
satisfactory solution of the important
question involved in the case.
MARS- ATL D. EwELL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
KINNEY v. McDERMOTT.
Plaintiff agreed with defendant on Sunday, at the house of the latter, to give
defendant a horse and $25, in exchange for a horse of defendant. This was consented to, and on the same day, pursuant to said agreement, plaintiff left his horse
with defendant, and took the horse of the latter away. The money was to be paid
the following Sunday at the house of the plaintiff. On Tuesday, following the
exchange, defendant in the plaintiff 's absence, and without his knowledge or consent, returned to the stable of the latter the horse received of him, and took away
the horse he let plaintiff have. A day or two later, plaintiff replevied the horse so
taken, and has since kept both horses, using the one returned by defendant and not
orenng to return either horse or money. Beld, that as the original contract was
an unlawful one, the court would render no aid to either party upon the contract;
but, as the plaintiff's possession was primafacieevidence of ownership, he might, on
the strength of that possession and the trespass of defendant, maintain replevin for
the horse so taken away by defendant.
VoL. XXI.-93

KINNEY v. McDERMOTT.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Buena Vista county.
.Replevin, in which the amount in controversy was less than
$100, trial by jury, and verdict for the plaintiff. Appeal by
defendant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

H. W. Weeden, Win. W~art and Robinson & Milchrist, foi
appellant.
C. D. Goldsmith, for appellee.
ROTHROCK, J.-The trial judge made the following certificate,
upon which we are authorized, under the statute, to entertain the
appeal:
"1. On Sunday plaintiff agreed with defendant, at the house
of the latter, to give defendant a horse and $25, in exchange for a
horse of defendant. This was consented to, and on the same day,
pursuant to said agreement, plaintiff left his horse with defendant,
and took the horse of the latter away. The money was to be paid
the following Sunday at the house of plaintiff. On Tuesday, following the exchange, defendant in the absence of plaintiff, and
without his knowledge or consent, returned to the stable of the
latter the horse received of him, and took the horse he let plaintiff
have away. A day or two later plaintiff replevied the horse so
taken, and has since kept both horses, using the one returned by
defendant, and not offering to return either horse or money.
Under these facts, can the plaintiff recover in his action of
replevin?
"2. Under the facts hereinbefore stated, can plaintiff recover in
replevin when his alleged right of possession, under the issues
made in the pleading, depends upon the ownership of the property?
"3. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover under the issues in this
action, and the facts as stated above ?"
A contract made and concluded on Sunday cannot be enforced
by action: Pike v. King, 16 Iowa 50. It is illegal, and the law
in such cases will leave the parties where it finds them, or rather
where they have placed themselves. If one party sells property
to another on Sunday, and delivers it, no action will lie for the
price agreed to be paid therefor: Pike v. King, supra. If the
defendant in this action had brought replevin for the horse, instead
of taking him by force, he would have been defeated, because he
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would have been obliged to introduce evidence to overcome the
presumption arising from plaintiff's possession. By the acts of
the parties in violation of law, the plaintiff became entitled to the
possession of the horse. This possession was such, that the
defendant could not have recovered by action the price, if sold and
not paid for, and could not maintain an action of replevin. He,
however, wrongfully and by a trespass, deprived the plaintiff of
the possession. The question is, will he be allowed to recover by
force what the law would not have aided him to recover peaceably ? It is insisted by counsel for appellant that, because the
plaintiff claims title to the horse, he was bound to introduce evidence of such title, and could only do so by showing the Sunday
contract. But, according to the certificate of the trial judge, the
plaintiff was in possession, and the defendant, by force, and without the knowledge of the plaintiff, removed the horse from plaintiff's stable. The question is, by what right did the defendant
possess himself of the horse ? The burden was on him to show
his right. In doing so, he would necessarily be compelled to
introduce the Sunday contract in evidence.
In Smith v. Bean, 15 N. H. 577, referring to a contract of
sale made on Sunday, it is said: "The transaction being illegal,
the law leaves the parties to suffer the consequences of their illegal
acts. The contract is void so far as it is attempted to be made
the foundation of legal proceedings. The law will not interfere
to assist the vendor to recover the price. The contract is void for
any such purpose. It will not sustain an action by the vendee
upon any warranty or fraud in the sale. It is void in that respect.
The principle shows, that.the law will not aid the vendor to recover
possession of the property if he has parted with it. The vendee
has the possession as of his own property by the assent of the vendor, and the law leaves the parties where it finds them. If the
vendor should attempt to retake the property without process, the
law, finding that the vendee had a possession which could not be
controverted, would give a remedy for the violation of that possession." See, also, 2 Pars. on Cont. 764, and notes. The author
admits there is some conflict of authority upon the question,
whether a vendee will be allowed to retain the property without
paying the price. In our opinion, he should, upon the ground
that the law will leave the parties where it finds them. It was
held in Pike v. King, supra, that the plaintiff could not recover
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the value of the property aside from the price agreed upon, or, in
other words, could not recover upon the quantum valebat.
Affizmed.
The statute under which the above
case was decided (2 McClain's Iowa
Statutes, sect. 4072), prohibits under a
penalty, the buying or selling of property of any kind, or any- labor, on
Sunday, work of necessity and charity
only excepted. In Massachusetts, Maine,
Michigan and Wisconsin, the statutes
upon this subject are very similar to
each other. The Michigan statute is as
follows: "No person shall keep open
his shop, warehouse -or workhouse, or
shall do any manner of labor, business
or work, except work of necessity or
charity, on the first day of the week;
and every person so offending, shall be
punished by a fine no exceeding ten
dollars for each offence."
Under that class of statutes in this
country prohibiting, with certain exceptions, the doing of labor, business or
work on Sunday, it seems clear that an
act done or contract entered into in violation of the act, should be field void;
and this, although the statute does not
in terms declare that acts done or contracts made in violation of the act, shall
be void (as in general they do not), it
being well settled that all contracts made
in violation of a statute are void: Robeson v. French, 12 Met. 24; Gregg v.
Wyman, 4 Cush. 322; Hazardv. Day,
14 Allen 487 ; Lyon v. Armstrong, 6 Vt.
219 ; 2 Pars. Cont. 762. This principle
is well illustrated by the late case 6f
DSort& v. Ws. 4- Minn. Railroad Co.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and reported in 3 Wis. Legal
News 278, where it was held, that
under sect. 4595, Rev. Stat. of Wis.
1878, making it unlawful "to do any
manner of labor, business or work,
except only works of necessity and
charity," on the first day of the week
or Sunday, a petition of the resident

taxpayers of a town, required by the
statute to be presented by a railway
company and filed with the clerk of the
town, signed by a majority of the resident taxpayers of a town, whose names
appeared upon the last assessment roll
of such town, where It appeared that a
large number of them signed such petition on Sunday; and without counting
the names of those who signed on Sunday, such petition would not contain a
majority of such taxpayers, was not
sufficient to authorize the company to
receive the bonds of such town, or the
town officers to issue the same in exchange for the stock of such company;
and that the fact, that the plaintiff in
the action brought to enjoin the issuing
of such bonds, was one of the taxpayers
who signed the petition on Sunday, was
not a sufficient ground in itself for refusing the relief demanded, the action
having been commenced promptly, and
before any action had been taken by the
company on the faith of their supposed
right to have the bonds.
As to the extent to which the contract
shall be held invalid in cases like the
principal case, the authorities are not entirely agreed. There appears to be no
difference of opinion among the authorities in any case where one of the parties
seeks affirmative relief upon the contract,
such relief being uniformly denied.
In the case of Tucker v. Mowry, 12
Mich. 378, it was held, that the contract
of sale and delivery made on Sunday,
was so utterly void that no title passed ;
and that, therefore, the vendor might on
a subsequent day tender back the price
and recover the property. In that case,
CGmsiTAWcr, J., referring to the prior
case of Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. 73,
said : "This decision we fully approve.
The statute not only makes it a penal
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ofience, but takes away the legal capacity to make a contract on that day.
And whether the supposed contract has
been executed or remains executory, we
think the rights of the parties are to be
determined in the same manner as if no
such contract hid ever been made. The
contract as such can neither be set up as
the basis of an action, nor as a ground
of defence. If it be a contract of sale
accompanied by delivery, as supposed
in the present case, no property passes ;
and the vendor, by tendering back what
he has received, may reclaim the property, and the vendee, on tendering back
the property, may recover the money or
property given in payment or exchange,
as if no pretence of such contract existed."
Referring to the subject of ratification,
the same learned judge, in the same case,
said: "But being utterly void, the contract is incapable of ratification. Doubtless the subsequent acts and assent of
the parties may be such as to make a
new contract, but they cannot ratify that
which is void."
The grounds of the decision were thus
stated: "As a general rule, courts of
law have left the parties to executed
.
illega contracts in the positions in which
they have placed themselves, refusing
aid tn either of them, when equally in
fault. But this is a question purely of
public policy, and consequently there
are exceptions to the rule. Courts
should give or refuse their aid, as the
one or the other course will be most
likely to discourage such contracts and
to promote the public welfare. The
illegality here in question is of a peculiar
kind. The contract is not illegal in
respect to the consideration, or the thing
done; these are neither immoral nor
forbidden by law. The illegality consists in making the contract on a particular day. This suit is not brought to
enforce the contract, but in disaffirmance
of it. And we think it much more in
accordance with sound public policy, to

treat the contract as utterly void, and to
allow the plaintiff, by tendering back
what he has received (or doing what is
in his power to place the vendee in stain
quo), to recover back his property, than
to refuse him a remedy, and thereby to
affirm the contract as valid. To refuse
all remedy in such cases, would be to
open a wide door to fraud. It would
operate not only as a trap to the ignorant and unwary, but as a direct encouragement to swindling. * * * One object
of the statute was to prevent the making
of contracts on Sunday, and to refuse to
sustain an action to recover back property sold on Sunday, would be offering
a premium to the dishonest to make their
contracts on that day. The rule we
have adopted, takes away from all parties this temptation."
See, also, Dodson v. Harris, 10 Ala.
566, which appears to have been decided
on the same theory as Tucker v. Mlowry.
*Where the question is not concluded
by authority, the reasoning in Tcker v.
Mowry would seem conclusive upon questions arising under similar statutes. But
looking at all the cases, perhaps, the
mere weight of authority will be found
to be with the principal ease, and to
favor the general rule above quoted, that
courts of law will leave the parties to
executed illegal contracts in the positions
in which they have placed themselves,
refusing aid to either of them when
equally in fault. See the leading case
of Smith v. Bean, 15 N.H. 577 ; Frewert v. Decker, Sup. Ct. of Wis., 13
Chicago Legal News 186 (a well considered case, where the authorities are well
coliected and discussed by CASSODAY,
J.) ; 2 Pars. on Cont. 764; Perkins v.
Jones, 26 Ind. 502 ; forse v. Kendall, 2
Pin. 99.
In order to obviate the very manifest
injustice which the application of this
rule will often occasion, some courts
have adopted the theory, that Sunday
contracts are not so utterly illegal and
void, as to be incapable of ratification.

THU GARLAND.
But as to what is necessary to constitute
such a ratification, the cases are at variance: see Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358;
Williams v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653; Froewert
v. Decker, 13 Chicago Legal News 186.
The case of Tucker v. Mowry, seems the
most reasonable upon this point, but it

not being considered in the principal
case, reference is simply made to Froewert v. Decker, supra, for the furthes
consideration of this subject, where the
cases will be found fully collected and
ably considered.
MARSHALL D. EwELL.

United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan.
THE GARLAND.
Although by the common law, and apparently also by the civil law, no action
will lie to recover damages for the death of a human being, in admiralty, a libel by
a father to recover for the loss of the services of his minor son, killed in a collision,
will be sustained.
Where a statute confers upon an administrator the right to recover for a loss of
life occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another, if such loss of
life is occasioned by a collision upon navigable waters, the administrator may pro.
ceed by a libel in rem against the offending vessel.

IN Admiralty. The original libel claimed damages for the loss
of the services of two minor sons of the libellant, killed in a collision between the steamers Garland and Mamie, in the Detroit
river. The collision was alleged to have been occasioned by the
fault and negligence of the Garland.
A supplemental libel was filed, setting up the appointment of
libellant as the administrator of his sons' estate, and claiming to
recover in this capacity under an act of the legislature of Michigan requiring compensation for death by wrongful act, neglect or
default. Exceptions were filed to both libels, on the ground that
a court of admiralty had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter.

Alfred Russell, for libellant.
Moore & Canfield, for claimant.

BRowN, D. J.-Can the original libel be maintained for the
loss of services?

Ever since the case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp.

493, it has been a settled doctrine of the common law that the
death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury in

-any court of civil jurisdiction. In such case the liability of the
defendant ceases with the life of the person injured. This rule
has remained undisturbed by a single well considered opinion,
except that of Sullivan v. The Union _Pacific Railway Co., 3
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Dill. 334, for over seventy years, and although it seems to be based
upon technical grounds, and does not commend itself to one's
sense of natural justice, it is too firmly established to be shaken
by judicial opinion. Such was also the ruling of the Supreme
Court of the United States in The Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95
U. S. 754, wherein it is said "that it is impossible to speak of it
as'a proposition open to question." The civil law writers appear
generally to take the same view, although the Court of Cassation,
in construing the Code Napoleon, seem to have held that such an
action would lie: JHubgh v. N. 0. & C. Railroad Co., 6 La. Ann.
495; Hermann v. Carrollton Railroad Co., 11 Id. 5.
Were this an original question, then, I should feel compelled to
hold that this libel could not be maintained. But other courts of
admiralty in this country have furnished so many precedents for a
contrary ruling, I do not feel at liberty to disregard them, although
I am at a loss to understand why a rule of liability differing from
that of the common law should obtain in these courts. The
earliest case upon the subject is that of .Plummer v. Webb, 1
Ware 75, in which Judge WARE upheld a libel by a father for the
death, by ill-treatment, of his minor son. On the question being
first presented to Judge SPRAGUE, he held, in Crapo v. Allen, 1
Sprague 184, that "for mere torts, the right of action by the
general maritime law, as by the civil law, dies with the person
injured;" citing Hall's Admiralty Practice 21; Dunlap's Admiralty Practice 87. But, on reconsidering the subject in Cutting
v. Seabury, 1 Sprague 522, he thought it could not be considered as
settled law, that no action could be maintained for the damages
occasioned from the death of a human being; but no decided
opinion was pronounced upon the point, and the libel was dismissed on other grounds. Notwithstanding the learned judge
made no attempt to distinguish between a court of common law
and a court of admiralty, his decision in Cutting v. Seabury has
boen cited in a large number of cases as a precedent for holding
that a court of admiralty would sustain such a suit, though a court
of common law would not: The Sea Gull, Chase's Decisions 145;
The Highland Light, Id. 150; The Towanda, 23 Int. Rev. Rec.
384; The Charles Morgan, 18 Am. Law. Reg., N. S. 624.
The whole subject is exhaustively discussed by the learned
judge of the district of Oregon, in the case of Holmes v. The
0. & C. Railway Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75, and the jurisdiction sus-
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tained. Against this concurrence of co-ordinate courts, I do not
feel at liberty to set up my own opinion particularly in view of the
fact that the common-law rule seems to be consonant neither with
reason nor justice.
I find less difficulty in sustaining libellant's claim under his
supplemental libel. By chapter 212 of the Compiled Laws of this
state, "whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrong
ful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such
as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured
to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then,
and in every such case, the person who, or the corporation which,
would be liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to a felony." The second section
provides that the action shall be brought by the personal representatives of the deceased person for the exclusive benefit of his
widow and next of kin. The tort in this case occurred upon navigable waters, and, had the deceased survived, there is no question
that he could have maintained the libel irrespective of any state
statute. In The Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 582, Mr.
Justice CLIFFORD expressed a doubt whether a state statute could
be regarded as applicable in such a case to authorize the legal
representatives of the deceased to maintain such an action for the
benefit of the next of kin, giving as a reason that state laws cannot extend or restrict the jurisdiction of federal courts. We had
supposed, from the reading of other cases, that where a state statute gave a right of action, a federal court would administer the
remedy where the requisite jurisdictional averments could be made;
and, if the action was maritime in its nature, a court of admiralty
would be a proper tribunal. Thus, in -Exparte lcNiel, 13 Wall.
243, a libel was sustained under a state statute allowing pilotage
fees to the pilot who first tenders his services.
In delivering the opinion, Mr. Justice SwAYNE observes: "The
state law cannot give jurisdiction to any federal court. But
that is not the question in this case. A state law may give a
substantial right of such a character that, where there is no
".mpediment arising from the residence of the parties, the right
a may be enforced in the proper federal tribunal, whether it be
court of equity, of admiralty or of common law. The statute
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in such cases does not confer the jurisdiction; that exists already, and it is invoked to give effect to the right by giving the
appropriate remedy. This principle may be laid down as axiomatic in our national jurisprudence." Other cases in the same
court announce a similar doctrine. But this question is also
so thoroughly reviewed in the case of Holmes v. The 0. & . Bailway Co., to which attention has been already called, that any
further consideration of the subject will result in a useless repetition of Judge DEADY'S reasoning, in which I fully concur.
In England the question whether a suit will lie in admiralty
under Lord CAMPBELL's Act is still unsettled. Sir ROBERT
PHILLIMORE sustained the jurisdiction, with some hesitation, in
the case of The Guldfoxe, Law Rep., 2 Ad. &'Ec. 325, and again
in The Explorer, Law Rep., 3 Ad. & Ec. 289. These rulings
were affirmed in the Privy Council in The Beta, Law Rep., 2 P.
C. 447. The question again arose in the case of The -Franconia,
46 Magistrate Cases 17, wherein the Court of Admiralty again
asserted its jurisdiction. On appeal to the new Appellate Court
the lord justices were equally divided in opinion. In a similar
case (Smith v. Brown, Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 729) the Court of
Queen's Bench issued a writ of prohibition to the Admiralty
Court. See Marsden on Collisions 64.
The whole controversy turned upon the construction to be given
to the word "damage" in the Admiralty Court Act, the Court of
Queen's Bench contending that the application of this word should
be limited to cases of damage to property, while the Privy Council
considered that it applied equally to injuries to persons. As the
jurisdiction of Admiralty Courts in this country is not fixed or
limited by any similar statute, these decisions throw but little
light upon the question.
Upon the whole I think the exceptions should be overruled.
If I am in error the Supreme Court will, upon application for a
writ of prohibition, afford a summary and speedy relief.
CAN THE PERSONAL

REPESENTA-

TIVES OF ONE WHOSE DEATH HAS BEEN

WRONGFULLY
WITHIN

ITS

CAUSED UPON WATERS
JtURISDICTION,

RECOVER

DAMAGES THEREFOR IN A COURT OP
ADMIRALTY?

There is no difficulty in answering
this question affirmatively, in cases
VOL. XXIX.-94

where the injury is infficted upon navigable waters within the jurisdiction of a
state. All the states have passed statutes similar to Lord CAxPBELL'S Act,
and under them, an action might undoubtedly be maintained. And, notwithstanding the objection, that to allow
this action under the state statute to be
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brought In a federal court, is to give
effect to such statute as conferring jurisdiction upon a United States Court
sitting in admiralty, the suit may
be brought there. The United States
Court acting in such case, gets its jurisdiction, not from the state law, but
from the federal statute conferring upon
it jurisdiction " of all maritime causes,"
taken in connection with the fact, that
the locality of the tort makes the cause
of action maritime. "Where a tort is
committed upon a public navigable water
of the United States, it is a marine tort,
within the jurisdiction of the proper
Admiralty Court :" Holmes v. 0. J- C. 1B.
Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75.
The right of action in this case, is
analogous to the right of material men to
a lien upon a vessel for supplies furnished it in a home port, or to the right
to half pilotage conferred in some states,
upon the pilot first tendering his services
to a vessel which refuses them. Both
the lien and the claim for half pilotage
exist solely by state laws. They are
maritime rights, however, and, as such,
are therefore enforceable in a federal
admiralty court. "The origin of the
right is in the state law, but the nature
of it authorizes the party in whose favor
it exists, to sue in the Admiralty Court :"
Holmes v. 0. 6- C. B. Co., supra. And
see The Planter, 7 Pet. 324 ; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 579 ; The Wright, I
Deady 597; The California, I Saw.
467; The Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2
Wall. 457 ; E parte .lc.&iel, 13 Id.
236.
Of the cases in which the injury occurred upon waters within the jurisdiction of a state, and which are usually

cited in support of- the maintenance of
the action by the administrator, it is observable, that while there are some dicta
in them clearly indicating that the judges
thought that such an action would lie by
the civil law, or by the general maritime
law, yet the right of' action is ultimately
and mainly rested upon the statute of the

Thus in The Highland Light
(1867), Chase's Dec. 150, the steamchimney of the vessel had collapsed,
while she was navigating waters within
the jurisdiction of Maryland, and caused
the death of Price, whose widow and
son filed their joint libel in rem against
the steamer. CHASE, C. J., held, that
"the positive law of statutes seems to
me, to furnish a sufficient rule for guidance in the case of relatives seeking redress for the death of a relative ;" * * *
that "the law of Maryland, I Md. Code
state.

449, * * * establishes

in one section

the general right to redress, and in
another, provides the mode in which
redress may be pursued;" that "the
right is quite separate from the remedy.
The rights, like that of a statute lien
upon a vessel for repairs in home ports,
may be enforced in admiralty by its own
processes. It is not necessary to pursue
the statutory remedy, in order to enforce
the statutory rights. It is clear, therefore, that for an injury such as that
proved in this case, the wife and son of
the man killed may have redress in
admiralty."
And so in the case of Holmes v. 0. 4"
C. R. 6o., supra. That was a suit by
an administrator to recover damages for
the death of one Perkins, who was killed
by defendant's negligence while being
ferried across the Willamette river, at
Portland, Oregon. The existence of the
right of action under the civil or maritime law, is discussed, but the administrator's right to sue is mainly grounded
upon the statute of Oregon. "In conclusion," says Judge DEADY, "the tort
which caused the death of Perkins, having occurred upon a navigable water of
the United States, is a marine one; and
even if the maritime law does not give a
remedy for the wrong, the law of the
state having given the right to the administrator to recover damages therefor.
this court, as a court of admiralty, has
jurisdiction of a suit to enforce such
right."
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It is more difficult to show, that a
right of action exists in the federal court,
when the injury occurs upon the high
seas, outside of the jurisdiction of the
state.
The common law is firmly established,
that no action lies for the death of a
hunmn being. See Thompson on Neg.,
v. 2, 1282, where the authorities upon
this point are collected.
It is true, that by the civil law [lex
Aquilial an action for damages was given
for killing human being-, but they were
slaves who were classed with cattle, for
the wrongful killing of which, the same
law gave the same action: Sandars
Justinian 502. The life of a free man
was considered inappreciable in coin.
An action was also given by the civil
law for personal torts to freemen, but
the action was personal to the person injured, and could not be transmitted to
his heirs, unless before his death the
action had already proceeded as far as
the litis contestatio: Sandars Justinian
514.
And, in Louisiana it is held, that an
action for damages caused by tortiously
killing a free human being, cannot be
maintained; and the court concluded,
that it is a general principle of the
Roman law, that actions for personal
injuries are strictly personal.
24 Pothier's Pandects 279, Law 13, is cited to
sustain this conclusion: Iaigh v. ANew
Orleans, 4-c., R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 498,
506.
Nor do any of the great maritime
codes-the laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy
of the Hanse Towns, or the Marine
Ordinance of Louis---give an action for
a personal injury, after the death of the
person injured.
And it seems to be the understanding
of leading text writers on maritime law,
that such actions do not survive the death
of the perzon injured : see Benedict's
kdmr. 185; 2 Parsons's Admr. 351 ;
Hall'sAdmr. Prac. 21 ; Dunlap'sAdmr.
Prac. 87. It was so held by Judge

in Crapo v. Allen, I Sprague's
Dec. 184.
There is no federal statute giving such
a right of action, and the question recurs: will the state statute give the
action where the injury occurs upon the
high seas?
In Armstrong v. Beadle, 5 Sawyer 484,
it was held, that the statute of Ci'ifornia
giving a right ,of action for negligence
resulting in death, has no extra-territorial
jurisdiction; and that death resulting
from negligence on the high seas, is not
within the statute. Judge SAwYER reasoned thus: "If it (the statute) operates
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
state, then it becomes a universal law,
applicable to all countries, and the legislature of California would be adoptitg a
code of laws affecting the rights of parties arising out of acts done wholly in
foreign countries. If California can pass
laws bf the kind, operating ex. a-territorially, then other states and couatries can
pass laws upon the same subject operating in California, and these laws may be
in conflict; but there is nothing in the
statute to indicate, that it was intended
to operate beyond the limits of the state."
But the high seas belong equally to all
men, like the air, and no part of them
can be rightfully appropriated by any
nation: Cooley's Const. Lim. 2. No
power now pretends to exercise jurisdiction over them. They are therefore not
analogous to a foreign country, having
its own laws and its own government ;
hence to declare a state statute applicable to transactions by its own citizens
upon its own vessels upon the high seas,
is not to make such statute "a universal
law, applicable to all countries." It is
not even to make such statute applicable
to any "country."
*And because the locus in quo, the high
seas, is not subject to the laws of any
other country, there can be no double
liability incurred by the tort-feasor ; nor
can it be said, that the deceased or his
representatives are under the protection
SPRAGUE

THE GARLAND.
of the laws of any other government:
see .3 allory v. McDonald, infra, 96.
A different objection was raised by
Judge SPRAGUE in Crapo v. Allen, 1

Sprague's Dec. 184. In that case it
was held, that a state statute will not
enable an administrator to maintain an
action in the District Court, for a personal tort committed to his intestate upon
the high seas, and which caused his
death. Judge SPRAGUE said: "Thetorts

set forth in this libel,, were committed on
the high seas ; the subject-matter, therefore, .is within the jurisdiction of all
courts of admiralty. But if a suit were
commenced in the District Court, sitting
in a state where no local statute gave
remedy to the administrator, it could not
be maintained. I cannot think, that for
a transaction upon the high seas, a personal suit in admiralty may be maintained in one district of the United
States, and not in others." To this it
may be replied, that since all the states
have passed statutes such as are referred
to (see 2 Thompson on Neg. 1294 et seq.),
a ," suit commenced in the District Court,
sitting in a state where no local statute
gave a remedy to the administrator,"
will never occur; such a suit will not,
therefore, be maintainable "in one district of the United States and not in
others."
"By the admiralty rules,"
continues Judge SPRAGUE, "established

by the Supreme Court, if a defendant
cannot be found, his property, or his
goods or credits, may he attached. Suppose this respondent had never come
within this state, and was never, therefore personally within the jurisdiction of
this court, but resided within a district
where he was liable to no action, can it
be that his goods and credits within this
state, could be held, by a suit in the
admiralty here? Such an incongruity is
inadmissible. I think that those claims
in the libel, which rest upon mere personal torts, cannot be sustained."
To this last objection the reply is, that
if the federal government has any juris-

diction to legislate upon such torts as
this, it has not exercised it; that, at
least, until that jurisdiction has been
exercised by Congress, the states may
pass laws applicable to the subject ; and
if the incongruity referred to result from
the absence or diversity of such state
legislation, it is only a natural and usual
consequence of constitution of government. It is not to be expected that the
legislation of thirty-eight states will result in conferring upon all citizens the
same rights, or to make them in all
places subject to the same liabilities;
and, further, as all the states have in
fact passed statutes similar to Lord
CAMPBELL'S

Act, the case supposed is

impossible of occurrence; the "inadwill therefore
missible incongruity"
never result. Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall.
610, is the highest and apparently a conclusive authority upon the subject under
examination. There A., an insolvent in
Massachusetts, owned a vessel. While
upon the high seas, the vessel was transferred by an insolvent court of Massachusetts in a proceeding in invitum in
insolvency, to an official assignee. After
this, and upon the arrival of the vessel
in New York, it was there attached by
New York creditors of the insolvent.
The suit was to determine whether the
prior right to the vessel was in the assignee in insolvency, or in the subsequent
attaching creditors.
The question was assumed to be one
concerning the transfer of property, and
laws regulating the same; and, expressly distinguishing the case from one
in bankruptcy, the position was taken,
that the state of MVfassaehusetts had not
delegated to the federal government any
power to pass laws regulative of the title
to property of its citizens upon the high
seas, or, at least, that no such power had
been exercised by the general government. "It is not perceived," said Mr.
Justice HUNT, 11 ** * that the relation
of Massachusetts to the union, has any
effect upon the title to this vessel. It
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stands as if the state were an independent sovereign state, unconnected with
the other states of the union. The question is the same as if this assignment had
been made in London by a British insolvent court, adjudicating upon the affairs
of a British subject." As to the applicability of the insolvent law of Massachusetts to the vessel while it was upon the
high seas, Justice HUNT continued :
"The rule is thus laid down by Mr.
Wheaton in his treatise on International Law (Sthed., sect. 106, et seq.) :
'Both the public and private vessels of
every nation on the high seas, and out of
the territorial limits of any other state,
are subject to the jurisdiction of the state
to which they belong. Vattel says, that
the domain of a nation extends to all its
just possessions, and by its possessions,
we are not to understand its territory
only, but all the rights it enjoys. And
he also considers the vessels of a nation
on the high seas, a portion of its territory. Grotius holds, that sovereignty
may be acquired over a portion of the
sea.' As an illustration of the proposition that the ship is a portion of the territory of the state, the author proceeds :
' Every state has an incontestable right
to the service of all its members in the
national defence, but it can give effect
to this right only by lawful means. Its
right to reclaim the military service of its
citizens, can be exercised only within
its own territory, or in some place not
subject to the jurisdiction of any other
nation. The ocean is such a place, and
any state may unquestionably there exercise on board its own vessels, its right
of compelling the military or naval servioes of its subjects.'
"Chancellor KENT, in his commentaries
(vol. 1, 26), says: I The high seas are
free and open to all the world, and the
laws of every state or nation have there
a full and perfect operation upon the
persons and property of the citizens or
subjects of such a state or nation.
No nation has any right or jurisdiction

at sea, except it be over the persons of
its subjects, in its own public and private vessels ; and so far territorial jrisdiction may be conceded as preserved,
for the vessels of a nation are, in many
respects, considered portions of its territory, and persons on board are protected
and governed by the law of the country
to which the vessel belongs.'
"Wharton (Conflict of Laws, sect.
356), says: ' A ship in the open sea
is regarded by the law of nations as a
part of the territory whose flag such ship
carries. By this' (he says) 'mav be
explained several cases quoted as establishing the lex domicidii, though they are
only sustainable on the ground that the
ship at sea is part of the territory whose
flag she bears. * * * In respect to principle, ships at sea and the property in
them must be viewed as part of the
country to which they belong.'
"The modem German law is to the
same point. Bluntschli, in his Moderne
V47/kerrecht (sect. 317), says: 'Ships
are to be regarded as floating sections
of the land to which they nationally
belong, and whose flag they are entitled
to carry.'
"Bisehof, in his Grundrissdes posiiven
internationalen seererhts (Graz. 1868,
cited in Wharton's Conflict of Laws,
sect. 356 n.), says: "Every state is
free on the seas, so that its ships are
to be regarded as floating sections of its
country, territoriaclausa; la continuation
ou Laprorogationda territoire, and those
on beard such ships in foreign waters
are under their laws and protection.
This even applies to children born to
subjects on such ships.'
"Wildman, in his treatise on International Law (40), says: "Provinces
and colonies, however distant, form a
part of the territory of the parent state.
So of its ships on the high seas. The
rights of sovereignty extend to all persons and things not privileged, that are
within the territory.' * **
"In the celebrated Trent Case, occur
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ring in 1862, Messrs. Mason and Slidell

jurisdiction is vested in the federal gov-

were removed from a British private

ernment, she must be regarded as parr
of the territory of the United States and

vessel by Commodore Wilkes, of the
San Jacinto, a public vessel of the United
States. Great Britain insisted that the
rights of a neutral vessel not only had
been violated, for which she demanded
an apology, but she insisted that these
persons should be replaced and returned
on board a British ship. This was done,
and they were actually placed on board
a British vessel in or near the harbor of
Boston. They were not British subjects,
and their return could only have been
demandel for the reason that they had
been torn from British soil, and the sanctity of British soil, as represented by a
British ship, had been violated."
Plestoro v. Abraham, 1 Paige 236, is
also cited, and affirming the applicability
of the Massachusetts insolvent law to
ships of that state upon the high seas, it
was held, that the ship was a part of the
territory of Massachusetts, and that tho
assignment by the insolvent court of that
state passed the title to her in the same
manner and with like effect as if she had
been physically within the bounds of
that state when the assignment was
executed: Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610.
Commenting upon this case, Judge
RAPALLO in McDonaldv. Mallory, infra,
94, says : * * * " I cannot escape the
conclusion that under the principle of
the case of Crapo v. Kelly, civil rights
of action for matters occurring at sea
on board of a vessel belonging to one of
the states of the Union, must depend
upon the laws of that state, unless they
arise out of some matter over which
jurisdiction has been vested in and
exercised by the government of the
United States, or over which the state
has transferred its right of sovereignty
to the United States, and that to this
extent the vessel must be regarded as
part of the terrtory of the state ; while,
fn respect to her relations with foreign
governments, crimes committed on board
of her, and all other matters over which

subject to the laws thereof."
And in the case of McDonald v. lral
lory, 7 Abb. New Cas. 84, it was held
that in respect to matters not committed
by the constitution exclusively to the
federal government, nor legislated upon
,by Congress, but regulated entirely by
state laws, the state to which the vessel
belongs is regarded as the sovereignty
whose laws follow her upon the nigh
seas, and until she comes within the
jurisdiction of some other government ;
that the statute of the state of New
York, giving a right of action for cansing death by wrongful act or neglect, is
not to be restricted to the actual territorial bounds of the state, but that under
it, an action can be maintained for thus
causing the death on the high seas, on
board of a vessel hailing from and registered in a port within the state of New
York, the person whose death was so
caused being also a citizen of such state.
the vessel being at the time employea
by the owners in their own business,
and their negligence having caused the
death.
In The Steamship City of Brussels, 6
Benedict 370, it was held that the cause
of action arose on contract and survived
to the administrator. In that case, a child
who was a passenger from Liverpool to
New York, was poisoned on the passage
and died, as was alleged, in consequence
of negligence on the part of the officers
of the ship. The father, as administrator, libelled the vessel for damages.
And see Coggins v. Helmsley, 23 Int.
Rev. Rec. 384; s. c. 34 Leg. Int. 394;
The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145; RPumamer v. Webb, 1 Ware 69 ; s. c. 4 Mason
380 ; Catting v. Seabury, I Spragne
522; The Charles Morgan, 18 Am. Law
Reg., N. S. 624; Brannick v. Rea Gull,
16 Pitts. L. J. 194.
This examination of the cases seems
to warrant the following statement of
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The wrongful killing of a
the lav
human being is a tort within the jurisdiction of the state governments. Statutes passed by them giving to the administrator or executor of the deceased
a right of action for such tort, are applicable when the killing takes place upon
navigable waters within the territorial
limits of the states respectively. On the
principle that, as to matters within the
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superseded by federal statutes, follow
and are in force upon vessels of the state
upon the high seas, such statutes also
give the executor or administrator a
right of action when the killing takes
place upon the high seas. The tort being
maritime, the right of action will be
enforced in a court of admiralty of the
United States, whenever the killing is
upon a navigable water.
A EL.BERT HAusLTox.

jurisdiction of a state, its laws, unless

Supreme Court of Indiana.
BUNNELL v. HAYS

ET AL.

A householder is one upon whom rests the duty of supporting the members of
his family or household.
A widower is a householder within the meaning of the exemption laws, although
all his children have arrived at full age and have left his domicile, leaving him, so
far as wife, children or kinsmen are concerned, living alone.
Where a man has, at the death of his wife, only an adopted child, and he employs
a family to keep house for him, he furnishing the greater part of the furniture and
nearly all the fuel, and paying the family so much per week; and the family supplying the food, caring for his room and doing his washing, such an one is a householder within the meaning of the exemption laws.

THE facts were as follows:-Bunnell, the appellant, who was
the owner of the personal property involved, became a resident
of White county, Indiana, in December 1877, and continuously
resided there until the trial of this action. His family, at the
time he became a resident of said county, consisted of his wife and an
adopted child. In March 1878, appellant's wife died; thereafter
appellant employed a family to keep house for him, he providing the
house, the greater part of the furniture and nearly all the fuel, and
paying the person who kept house for him, in addition the sum of
$1.20 per week. The person or persons who kept house for him
supplied the food, cared for appellant's room and did his washing.
An execution was issued against appellant on the 26th day of
November 1878, and on the 6th day of December of the same
year, was levied on the personal property in controversy. At the
time the levy was made, the child was living with appellant, but
at the time of the trial, was on a visit to its natural mother.
Prior to the levy of the execution, appellant claimed his right to
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hold the property as exempt from execution, and executed and tendered the proper schedule. The value of the property was less
than three hundred dollars.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The question is: Was the appellant a nouseholder,
and entitled to have the property in controversy exempt from levy
and sale upon execution ?
ELLIOTT,

As we gather from the record and brief of the appellant-there
is none from the appellee-the claim of the appellant to hold the
property as exempt from execution was denied, upon the ground
that he was not a resident householder within the meaning of the
law. The conclusion of the court below was erroneous. The
appellant, during the life of his wife was, beyond all possibility
of respectable controversy, a resident householder, and the death
of his wife did not deprive him of that character, nor of the legal
rights belonging to it. No one, we think we dare say, would
seriously contend that a man ceased to be a householder the instant
his wife died, and yet, if her death determines his rights to be
considered a householder, that effect attaches without an instant's
delay. The child, although an adopted one, was dependent upon
the appellant for support. The appellant's home was that of the
child, and the absence of the latter on a visit to its natural mother,
did not change its domicile: Gufin v. Sutherland, 14 Barb. 456;
Ward v. Jones, 20 Mo. 75; Norman v. Bellman, 16 Ind. 156.
-It was the duty of the appellant to support the child, which was
his by adoption, and the case, therefore, falls within the rule sanctioned by many authorities, that he is to be deemed a householder
upon whom rests the duty of supporting the members of his family
or household: Thompson's Homestead and Exemptions, sects. 54,
46; Smith on Homestead and Exemption, sect. 532.
The fact that appellant secured the services of others to prepare
and furnish food, and to take care of his furniture and rooms, did
not take from him the character of householder. The employment of the persons for the purpose mentioned, were not, in effect,
different from the hiring of servants, and paying them daily or
weekly wages. In Graham v. Crockett, 18 Ind. 119, it was held
that where "a man and his sister live together, both owning some
personal property, and contributing toward their household ex
penses, and the brother appeared to direct affairs, he was a resi-
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dent householder within the meaning of the act exempting property from seizure upon execution." In Brown v. ,S'tratton, 8
Cent. L. J. 46, Brown leased the premises, retaining one room,
the tenant furnishing and preparing the food, and it was held that
Brown was to be regarded as a householder. In many cases it has
been held, that a widower is to be regarded as a householder,
although all his children may have arrived at full age and have
left his domicile, leaving him, so far as wife, children or kinsmen
are concerned, living alone: Kimbue v. Willi*, 12 Cent. L. J. 211;
Lilloway v. Brown, 12 Allen 84; Whalen v. Cadman, 11 Iowa
226; Aeyers v. Ford, 22 Wis. 139; Barney v. Leeds, 51 N. H.
253; Blackwell v. Broughton, 56 Geo. 392.
Judgment reversed at the cost of the appellees.
The law of exemption of property
fcom sale upon an execution, is for the
protection of the defendant debtor, and
to enable him to enjoy the necessary
comforts of life. In view of the object
of such humane provision, the statute
itself and the mode of carrying it into
effect is to be liberally construed:
Greqory v. Latchem, 53 Ind. 449; "the
statute should have a liberal construction to accomplish the object of the law :I"
Buxton v. Dearborn, 46 N. H. 43. If
the terms of the statute are ambiguous,
the court "must resort, in order to ascertain their meaning, to the general
spirit and intent of the enactment, keeping in view its known object and the mischief intended to be remedied :" Wassell
v. Tunnah, 25 Ark. 103. These statutes are "of a humane character, and
should be held to apply fairly to all such
eases as are within the equity and spirit
of the act ; but beyond this we must
not go :" True v. Morrill, 28 Vt. 674.
Exemption "should be favored so far as
to apply it to all such cases as are within
the equity and spirit of the statute :"
Mills v. Grant, 36 Vt. 271. Such statutes "are entitled to be liberally construed :" Campbell v. Adair, 45 Miss.
182. " Such construction, consistent
with the spirit of the provision, should
be given as would promote and secure
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the purpose intended:" Franklin v.
Coffee, 18 Tex. 416. "It is a cardinal
rule in the interpretation of such statutes, that they are to be liberally construed in order to promote the object of
their enactment. They are intended to
benefit the laboring classes, which make
up a large part of our society, and to
enable them the better to provide for
those dependent upon them for support
and maintenance :" .Kuntz v. Kinney,
33 Wis. 510. "In view of their benevolent and humane character," they
"are entitled to be liberally viewed by
the courts :" Cox v. Wilder, 2 Dill. 49.
",The humane policy of the Iomestead
Act seeks not the protection of the
debtor, but its object is to protect his
family from the inhumanity which would
deprive its dependent member of a home.
* * * And in aid of this wise and humane policy, the whole act should receive
as liberal construction as can be fairly
given to it:" Sears v. Hanks, 14 Ohio
St. 300. The following authorities are
to the same effect as the quotations above
indicate: M3cClaryv. Bixby, 36 Vt. 257 ;
Tillotson v. Millard, 7 Minn. 519; Roff
v. Johnson, 40 Geo. 555 ; Nnland v. Wickham, 9 Ala. 169 ; Cusic v. Douglass 3
Kan. 123; Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How.
311 ; Trawick v.H arris, 8 Tex. 314:
Robinsonv. Wiley, 15 N. Y. 494; Bevan
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wife, although she may have to conv. Hayden, 13 Iowa 122; 31ontague Y.
tribute to the support of the family, is
Richaraison, 24 Conn. 338; Moss v.
not "the debtor having a thmily,'* or
Wfarner, 10 Cal. 296 ; Coniraughton v.
" dependent upon him for
"mother"
Sands, 32 Wis. 387 ; Peverly v. c'ayles,
10N. II. 358; Good v. Fogg, 61 Ill. support :" Fuselier v. Buckner, 28 La.
450 ; Freeman v. Carpenter, 10 Vt. 434 ; Ann. 594. To constitute afaidly within
Wilcox v. Hawley, 31 N. Y. 648; Bich- the meaning of the statute, there must
be a condition of dependence and not a
ardson v. Buswell, 10 Met. 506. Some
mere aggregation of individuals: Sallee
courts taking the view that they are in
derogation of the common law have conv. WVaters, 17 Ala. 488 ; Allen v. Manstrued these statutes strictly: Rue v. rasse, 4 Id. 554. Such is the case of
a single woman supporting an infint
Alter, 5 Denio 119 ; Temple v. Scott, 3
Minn. 421 ; Hammer v. Freese, 19 Penn. son: Cantrell v. Conner, 51 How. Pr.
45 ; see also Ex parte Brien, 2 Tenn.
St. 257 ; Ward v. Huhn, 16 Minn. 161;
Ch. 33. And a single man, who has no
Guillory v. Deville, 21 La. Ann. 6S6;
Fuselier v. Butckner, 28.Id. 594 ; Todd one living with him except servants and
employees, is not the head of a family :
v. Gordy, 28 Id. 666 ; Briant v. Lyons,
Garaty v. DuBose, 5 S. C. 498; (al29 Id. 65; Crilly v.
'he Sheriff, 25
houn v. .3facLendon, 42 Gco. 406: and
Id. 219 ; Olson v. Nelson, 3 Minn. 53.
going to the full length of the statute, it
It is in view of this rule of interprewas held that an unmarried person who
tation of these statutes of exemption
that, probably, the court has sought to had adopted a child, and maintahied
servants and a household, was not the
bring the appellant within the statute.
Cases will often arise in which those not head of a family: In the M]atter of Lambhouseholders have as much equity to the son, 2 Hughes (S. C.) 233.
But the question of actual dependence
right of exemption as those who are.
Tomlin defines a householder to be " the is not essential, as the majority of the
cases I old, to constitute a family. As
occupier of a house, a housekeeper or
where a widowed mother, the daughter
master of a family :" 2 Tom. Diet. 127.
of several children, resided with her
Wharton, "an occupier of a house; a
father in his house, ate at the same table
master of a family :" Whart. Dict. 356.
with him and with her children, yet culThe statute construed by the court
tivated certain portions of his land, she
enacted that, by complying with certain
was held to be the "head of a family :'
conditions, any "resident householder"
Bachman v. Crauford, 3 Humph. 213.
could have three hundred dollars worth
Pollard v. Tomason, 5 Id. 56 ; Brigham
of his property set-off as exempt from
execution. Similar terms are found in v. Bush, 33 Barb. 596. In Kentucky,
it has been held that a practising
all exemption statutes, such as "housephysician, a widower with two young
nolder, or head of a family," " head of
a family," " every householder being daughters, whom he kept in the care of
his mother, providing for them, while
the head of a family," "every debtor
he occupied a single room, one mile diswho is the head of a family," "every
householder having a family," "bonafide tant, as an office and dwellng, without
housekeeper with a family," "to every servants or other family than such
family," "of every housekeeper," &c. children, who were sometimes at his
Having a wife is having a family: Kit- office, where he lodged and cooked and
chell v. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40; Cox v.
ate his meals, was a housekeeper with a
Stafford, 14 How. Pr. 521. As to what
family residing with him : Seaton v. Marconstitutes a family, see IVilson v. Coch- shall, 6 Bush 429, but, of course, a
ran, 31 Tex. 680. In Louisiana, a housekeeper who had no family could not
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claim exemption under such a statute:
Gunn v. Gudehus, 15 B. Mon. 452.
An unmarried man whose indigent
motner and sister lives with him and are
e
supported by him, is "th head of a
family:" .31arshv.Lazenby, 41 Geo. 153;
Cannaughtonv. Sands, 32 Wis. 387 ; so
such an one supporting his widowed
daughter and her child: Black-well v.
Broughton, 56 Geo. 390 ; or a widower
and his grown up daughter: Cox v.
Stafford, 14 How. Pr. 521 ; or a minor
child : Barney v. Leeds, 51 N. H. 253;
or a bachelor for whom his sister keeps
house : Bailey v. Comings, 16 Nat. Bank
Reg. 382.
The head of a family may be one who
supports his dependent minor brothers
and sisters : Greenwood v. 3Maddox, 27
Ark. 658. This case is, in a measure,
opposed by Mc~furray v. Shuck, 6 Bush
111. So the head of a family is one
who supports his widowed sister, either
with or without children: 1Vade v. Jones,
20 Mo. 75. So is a widower without
children, living in his own house with
his widowed mother: Parsonsv. Livingston, 11 Iowa 104. But where a single
man moved on to a farm, taking with
him his brother and such brother's wife,
and the two brothers worked the farm on
shares, such single man is not the head
of the family, although he furnish the
necessaries for housekeeping and had
general control of the establishment:
Whaten v. Cadman, 11 Iowa 226. The
court said: "The married brother and
wife, in no proper sense, belonged to
the family of the plaintiff. He had no
control over them except such as resulted
purely and exclusively from contract.
He had no right to exact obedience from
them or direct their movements, except
so far as their agreeiment bound them to
take care of the house. One brother
was as much interested in the profits of
the farm as the other. If the plaintiff
was the head of this family, then the
married one could not be, and this will
scarcelybe claimed." In Massachusetts,

it was held that a woman who was never
married, although she live on the property with her mother, was not a householder having a family: Woodworth v.
Comstock,10 Allen 425. But in another
case it was held, a householder does not
lose the right of homestead by death of
his wife and departure of his children
who have arrived at maturity : Silloway
v. Brown, 12 Allen 34; or by divorce:
Doyle v. Coburn, 6 Id. 71 ; contra: Resalk v. Kroamer, 8 Cal. 72. In California, an unmarried woman who has the
care of her child, a minor, although such
child is a bastard, is the head of the
family: Ellis v. WTfite, 47 Cal. 75.
But in Georgia, a wife who has no children of her own, is not the head of a
family of the children of her husband
by a former marriage: Lathrop v. Loan
Assoc., 45 Ga. 483. Where the husband
abandons the family, the wife becomes
the head of the family: Wright v. Hayes,
10 Tex. 130. Property that had been
owned by the husband, who died, leaving his widow and child surviving him,
was set apart by statute for the support
of the family; the widow married a
second time, but supported her child.
It was held that she could claim such
property as exempt, she being a householder within the meaning of the statute: Brigham v. Bush, 33 Barb. 596.
And where a married woman resides
with her husband upon her own separatu
estate, she is entitled to exemption under
a statute, according a homestead to each
"citizen of the state, male or female.
being a householder and having a
family:" Partee v. Stewart, 50 Miss.
717. But an adult person residing with
his stepmother, the latter owning the
farm and farm-house, and having a large
family, he transacting her business, is
not a householder, since the stepmother
and not the stepson is the head of the
family: Bowne v. Witt, 19 Wend. 475;
Grf n v. Sutherland, 14 Barb. 456.
So where one rents a house in which
he lives and fakes boarders, though ha
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has no family, yet he is a householder:
Hutchinson v. Chamberlin, II N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 248; Brown v. Brown, 68 Mo.
388. And the fact that a woman keeps
a house of ill-fame, does not prevent her
from being considered a householder
within the meaning of the exemption
law: Bowman v. Quackenboss, 3 Code
R. 17.
If a person possesses the character of
a nouseholder, he does not lose it by
moving with his property from one house
to another, several miles distant: Mark
v. Bowless, 15 Ind. 98; Woodward v.
Murray, 18 Johns. 400 ; Davisv. Allen,
ti Ala. 164. Or by a temporary abandonment of housekeeping and storing of
furniture: Griffin v. Sutherland,14 Barb.
458; Cantrell v. Connor, 51 How. Pr.
45 ; s. c. 6 Daly 224. From the above
cases, it will be seen that the term householder is synonymous with "head of the
family," "master or chief of a family,"
or "'one who keeps house with his
family." In fact, the last clause is the
definition given by Bouvier: I Bony.
Dict. 673. The cases that have been
cited are then nearly all expositions of
the term householder, and illustrate it in
the many phrases that human life and
families may assume. It only remains
to examine the word as applied to certain other statutes of a different purport.
Under the Texas statute that says a
juror must be a freeholder or a householder, one who "rents a room and
boards," is a householder. It does not
appear whether the juror had a family or
not: Robleov. State, 5 Tex. App. (Cr.)
346.
In Oregon, an unmarried man who
keeps a house and employs domestic
servants, is a householder within a law
calling for a petition by householders for
the establishment of a road: Karner v.
(,'atsqp Co., 6 Ore. 238. But in Alabama, where a person rented a "room
bylthe year, and occupied it as a lodging-room, and exercised exclusive con-

trol of said room, and had occupied
it then for more than a year," the
court held he was not a householder,
saying: "Householder, in our statute,
means something more than the mere
occupant of a room or house. It implies in its terms the idea of a domestic
establishment--of the management of a
household." The words of the statute
were that he should be a "resident
householder or freeholder :" Aaron (a
slave) v. The State, 37 Ala. 106. One
who rents and occupies a portion of- a
building as an office for business purposes, has been held a householder for
the purposes of bail, evidently upon the
theory that the intent of the statute was
to secure permanency of abode in the
state, and that that end was attained as
much by securing one who was permanently engaged in business, upon a lease
of a place of business, as by obtaining
ond who rented a dwelling and resided
there with his family: Somerset Savings
Bank v. Huyck, 33 How. Pr. 323. See
also Hemming v. Plenty, 1 Moore 529 ;
Savage v. all, I Bing. 430; contraWalker's Bail, 1 Chit. 316. Proceeding
upon the same theory, in cases of bail,
the court held that where a sudden death
in the family of the out-going tenant
prevented the bail from obtaining possession of the house of which he had become tenant, and respecting which he
claimed to be entitled to the character of
housekeeper, was not in fact a housekeeper: Bald's Bail, 1 Chit. 288.
Where one occupied every room in the
house of which he claimed his right to be
considered a housekeeper, with the exception of one apartment, which was
reserved by the landlord for his own accommodation, on the condition of his
paying all the taxes, it was held such
person was not a householder: Bald's
Bail, 1 Chit. 502.
For the distinction between householder and housekeeper, see King v.
Hall, 2 D. & R. 241 ; S. a. I B. & Cr
123. SeealsoKingv. _boynder, Id. 178

